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Abstract
Peer-group mechanisms have been widely used by micro-credit institutions to minimize default risk.
However, there are costs associated with establishing and maintaining liability groups. In the case when
output is fully observable, we propose a dynamic individual lending mechanism. Assuming that risky
borrowers discount the future costs and benefits relatively higher, our mechanism performs equally well in
repayment rates, distinguishes safe and risky borrowers through differentiated interest rates and payment
schedules. In case of unobservable types, it is able to eliminate adverse selection problem, and it reaches the
first best outcome of the case that types of borrowers are publicly known. It improves wealth of individuals,
and hence achieves a net welfare-superior outcome when compared with joint liability. Individual lending
further saves from internal costs of group formation, and broadens the fractions of society into which
microfinance institutions penetrate. We also identify unique welfare maximizing contract in our mechanism.
Finally, we introduce a history dependent success probabilities, and show existence of efficient individual
contract in that environment.
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1 Introduction
Microfinance institutions (MFI) mostly rely on joint liability (JL) mechanisms and peer-group effects
to minimize the risk, reduce monitoring costs and achieve high turnout rates (Yunus, 1999). Participants
are required to form a liability group (of varying sizes) to be eligible for a credit. It is argued that this
innovation was instrumental in microfinance’s success (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch, 2010; Daley-
Harris, 2009; Morduch, 1999) and provide social collateral. Empirical evidence on that is mixed though.
Al-Azzam et al. (2012) documented evidence for positive effects of peer monitoring on repayment rates.
Attanasio et al. (2011), Gine and Karlan (2014) and Godquin (2007) found that the repayment rate does
not significantly differ between individual and group lending. Wydick (1999) also found that group pres-
sure is not significant in dealing with moral hazard. Gine et al. (2006) observed that ”the group-based
mechanisms that are frequently employed can induce moral hazard (or more risk-taking behavior) instead
of reducing it.”. Benarjee (2013) also argues about that the theory is missing that monitoring the others
with no control on them increases free riding of others safe choices, and increase risk taking. Fischer (2010)
with an experiment also concludes that JL stimulates risk taking further. Thus, we conclude that a model
of group lending with ex antetypes may fail to capture this effect of altering behaviors of individuals after
group formation. With this in hand, we also know that Graamen, ACCION and BancoSol have been the
pioneers of the group lending with different mechanisms, whereas, now they are converting from group to
individual lending. The trend is same for Europe, El Salvador, Peru and many other countries.
There are potential sources of inefficiencies pertaining the group lending mechanisms. Group require-
ment could cause an inefficiency by leaving out those who would have succeeded in availability of credit
but do not have access to it because they couldn’t form a group1. Indeed, Gine and Karlan (2014) found
that ”The conversion to individual liability did lead to larger lending groups, hence further outreach”(82).
Furthermore, microcredit institutions offer a single loan scheme with a flat interest rate to all borrowers.
However, both within groups and across groups, debtors differ in ability and potential to succeed. If
credits were offered to individuals, adverse selection could be the result. Peer-groups are meant to induce
cooperative behavior and keep turnout high. But there are costs associated with forming and maintaining
groups, which raises an efficiency concern. Bhatta and Tang (1998) also mention about that in some cases
MFI also involves in group formation mechanism which adds more administrative costs to the institution.
Several studies investigated properties of joint-liability mechanisms. Besley and Coate (1995) showed
that JL schemes may have positive and negative effects on repayment rates. Successful members will have
an incentive to cover for those who couldn’t pay back. Liability works in other way if the whole group
defaults (”strategic default”). Armendariz de Aghion (1999) showed that individual lending could outper-
form group lending if peer monitoring is very costly and social sanctioning abilities are limited. Another
problem Besley and Coate (1995) points to is collusion among borrowers in group lending, which demands
more complex punishment mechanisms with potentially further monitoring costs. Our mechanism replaces
individual liability while maintaining same expected return for the bank. So, it does not suffer from po-
tential drawbacks of group liability.
Another strand of studies argue about the efficiency of JL and societal characteristics. Aghion and
Morduch (2000) infer that group lending may be a poor mechanism for the industrialized societies. Lad-
man and Acfha (1990) and Arene (1993) conclude that lack of cooperative behavior among members of
the society give rise to failures of gruop lending in Bolivia and Nigeria, respectively. Moreover, Gine et
al (2011) effect on religion on repayment rates of group lending. Ahlin and Townsend (2007) shows that
social structures that decrease penalties may reduce the repayment. Cassar et al. (2007) and Azzam et al.
(2011) infer that the specific nature of society affects repayment performance differently. The latter found
1In general there are large number of peers requested for group lending. For instance, Graamen requires 5 people, Indian
system for 6-10 people, and 5 for Turkey case.
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that percentage of relatives in group may worsen the repayment rate, since it is hard to enforce relatives
in some socities. These require a stirct analysis of the traditions and life style of the society in designing
group mechanism which does not seem very practical. Bhatt and Tang (1998) emphasize the effect of
geographic proximity on the success of group lending due to potentially high costs of communication and
monitoring of peers. Noballa (1992) and Azzam et al. (2011) represent the evidence of this kind of negative
impacts. Addilitonally, JL in general depends on that ex-ante borrowers know each others types which
is a hidden information in terms of banks. This assumption is even harder to the members who are not
geographically close. All these reveal the difficulties for implementing ”true” group lending mechanism for
different societies, and thus pave the way for individual lending.
For borrowers’ side, group formation costly, internal cost of this. The amount of this cost may prevent
the borrower to go to bank and it depends on the social environment she has. If they do not know each
other for a long time, they may not have an idea about the risk of the others projects, which is assumed
in theory. and they cannot trust. Also as discussed, Close relatives cannot apply sanctions to each others
in some societies.
Rai and Sjostrom (2004) argued that a JL mechanism with a cross-reporting scheme leads to a better
risk-sharing and less defaults. Bhole and Ogden (2010) similarly discussed the importance of cross-reporting
mechanisms and found that in the absence of sanctions, group lending does worse than individual lending
in repayment rates. Bond and Rai (2008) relied on social sanctions to enforce payments. Given the costly
nature of such sanctions, it would be an improvement if we can substitute individual liability instead of
group liability while maintaining same returns. Our dynamic mechanism addresses this problem. Bond
and Rai (2008) proposes “cosigned loans” as an alternative to group loans when sanctioning abilities differ
among individuals. Our individual lending mechanism produces better results in terms of welfare than JL
schemes, independent of sanctioning abilities.
Individual lending as an alternative to group-lending were not studied as extensively as group lend-
ing mechanisms. One notable exception is Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch (2000). They propose
mechanisms with more stringent direct monitoring and restricted payment schedules that brings an effect
equivalent to peer groups. Assuming that riskier types discount the future more, our mechanism introduces
differentiating interest rates and repayment schedules which achieves same outcome without further direct
monitoring.
Bhatt and Tang (1998) extensively discusses transaction costs in group lending. They point to the
”...costs associated with screening potential group members, group formation, agreeing on formal or infor-
mal group rules...” (624). Shatragom and Bayer (2013) argues in similar vein. The mechanism we develop
addresses transaction cost concerns in two ways. We require no group formation so there is no fixed cost
of eligibility. Also in equilibrium, the loan contract that bank offers leads to a self-selection of agents (safe
and risky types) with respect to their success probabilities. This differentiation reduces bank’s monitoring
costs and improves welfare.
In this paper, we address these issues by proposing a dynamic credit mechanism. In our model, risk-
neutral individuals borrow in period 0 and pay back in (not necessarily equal) periodic installments, raising
revenue in each period from their initial investment. We assume that the creditor can perfectly observe
debtors’ revenues whereas types of individuals are private information for others and bank. We show that
in a dynamic setting where agents discount future benefits and costs differently, it is possible to offer
individual credit contracts with differing interest rates and pay-back schemes which improve welfare and
perfectly distinguishes among types of individuals in equilibrium. Following Rai and Sjostrom (2004),
bank’s expected revenues from both safe and risky types of individuals are equal so bank is equally likely
to extend credit to both types. This screening through contracts remedies potential adverse selection prob-
lem and achieves an improvement in welfare when compared with the equivalent JL case. Our mechanism
allows for individual lending and hence, saves on monitoring costs associated to group lending. It also
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extends the reach of credit opportunities by relaxing the group requirement. Benarjee (2013) addresses the
new directions for future reseach on theoretical side. He discusses the significance of identifying optimal
dynamic credit contract under the presence of behavioral aspects. In line with Banerjee (2013)’s agenda,
we also investigate the impact of JL in dynamic contracts and show that individual liability mechanism
we offer strictly dominates an equivalent JL mechanism in terms of welfare. The dynamic aspects of our
mechanism are essential. In the practice, microfinance institutions sign a dynamic repayment scheme with
their borrowers in weekly or monthly terms. In many practical cases, payments starts in general as soon
as borrowing is done in the following week or month. Fischer (2011) hints that just a 2 month delay for
repayment makes a large effect on income of borrowers. Indeed, the wedge between discount factors allowed
a welfare-superior individual liability credit contract. Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) and Chowdhury (2005,
2007) work in sequential environments. In our dynamic model, we assume that output realizations occur
every period and borrowers discount future. In case of that types of borrowers are not private information
by the lender, there is no problem and bank can charge perfectly desired interest rates to each type. This
yields the first best outcome with distinct rates for distinct types. On the other side, if it cannot observe
the types of borrowers, a unique contract may pose adverse selection problem. We assume types of agents
are not seen by lender, and differentiate the payment schemes. We introduce two schemes and first alter
period-wise payments of only one type of contract. Using our assumption that safe type discounts less than
risky type, we solve adverse selection problem. Hence, we achieve exactly to the best outcome in which
types are observed by the bank. We also improve welfare of both individuals and society when compared
with the JL case in which bank gets same expected repayment. Second, we also alter the other contract
and introduce a new payment scheme which further increase individual welfares. It is also the welfare-
maximizing contracts for the society. We finally extend our environment to a more general one. We relax
the history independent success probabilities, and add a memory to the likelihood of success of projects.
In this new environment, we also show the existence of same kind of contract with individual lending. To
the best of our knowledge, this study is the first in the microlending literature, by incorporating dynamic
payment scheme and discount factors of individuals, which at the end reaches the first best solution with
individual lending mechanism.
Our mechanism screens safe and risky types under an individual lending scheme without a loss to the
bank and society. Ghatak (1999,2000) showed that with JL and self-selection, safe borrowers gather to-
gether to form credit cooperatives and risky borrowers are screened out. We achieve the same equilibrium
outcome without JL. Ghatak and Guinnane (1999) discusses moral hazard problems in group-lending.
We’ve already discussed the cost issues of such peer-monitoring mechanisms. Thus, there is a clear effi-
ciency gain from replacing JL with individual liability in case of observable outputs.Table 1 represents the
summary of parameters.
Parameter Definition
ρ Competetive interest rate for 2 periods
βi Discount factor of type i agents
pti Success probability of type i agent for period t
Ri Interest rate charged to type i agents
Rit Interest rate charged to type i agents at period t
X Output in case of success in each period
θ Fraction of safe tyoe agents in society
γ History effect on the success at t = 2
Table 1: Summary of parameters
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 introduces the
benchmark individual contract shceme with welfare discussions. Section 4 identifies the welfare maximizing
one among these individual contracts. Finally, in Section 5, we change the environment with history
dependency and identify the contract in this environment. Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
There are two types of potential borrowers, safe and risky. θ fraction of all borrowers are of safe type
whereas (1− θ) fraction of them are risky. Types are private information of each borrowers herself. Neithr
other borrowers nor the lender does not know the type of any borrower. Each type borrows from the
same lender (MFI), and invest their funds in their businesses. We assume output for projects are same
regardless of types. Investment of each borrower either yields a revenue of X with a positive probability
or nothing for each period. Hence, if a borrower succeeds for both periods, she receives 2X as output. We
assume that the lender observes this output for each period. Following Rai and Sjstrm (2004), we assume
poor people have no assets, then they are not supposed to repay anything in case of failure. Borrowers
are required to pay (gross) interest on their loan only when the outcome is success. Let ps and pr be the
success probabilities of safe and risky types, respectively and for each period. We assume that ps > pr.
Let ρ be the two-period market interest rate, which is defined as the total amount a borrower need to
pay back for $1 credit. Following Rai and Sjostrom (2004), we assume that microcredit institution in a
competetive market sets interest rates R such that the expected revenue is market rate. This may be also
called as zero profit constraint (ZPC) for MFI. Thus, it does not extract profit for itself, and supposed to
maximize welfare of society. In the case of a uniform credit contract, this corresponds to pR = ρ where
p = θps + (1− θ)pr (i.e. average success probability for the society). Let Rs and Rr be the interest bank
is willing to charge to safe and risky types, respectively if it can observe the types. That is, there rates
are able to perfectly differentiate the types and there is no adverse selection problem. Then, ZPC implies
psR
s = prR
r = pR = ρ. We note that since ps > pr, Rs < Rr.
We construct a dynamic framework in which agents borrow in period 0, invest in their businesses and
repay the interest in two (not necessarily equal) periodic installments. Rit denotes the payment type i is
supposed to make at time t according to her contract. Following diagram illustrates the timeline:
Figure 1: Timeline
The success or failure of type i at t = 1 does not affect her success and fail probability for the following
period. The intiution behind this is that, a borrower may produce some hand-made products like in a
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village economy, and try to sell those. Having made the investment, the probability that she can sell her
products is approximtely same for each time period. Agents are risk-neutral. In a given period, net utility
of a borrower type i is pi(X − Rit). Safe and risky borrowers discount future benefits with βs and βr
respectively. We assume that βs ≥ βr, which is, as we will show, a necessary condition for existence of
differentiated contracts that are incentive compatible. One can interpret this as follows: safe individuals
are more likely succeed in future periods so they tend be concerned less about immediate gratification.
With these in hand, expected utility of agent i with individual contract (H i1, H
i
2) as follows:
EUi(H
i
1, H
i
2) = piβi(X −H i1) + piβ2i (X −H i2) ∀ i ∈ {s, r}
Given the fraction of safe types in the society θ and payment schemes for both type (Hs1 , H
s
2) and
(Hr1 , H
r
2), welfare of the society is given as follows:
EWsoc(H
s
1 , H
s
2 , H
r
1 , H
r
2) = θ(psβs(X −Hs1) + psβ2s (X −Hs2))+
(1− θ)(prβr(X −Hr1) + prβ2r (X −Hr2))
Given that types are not observable and psR
s = prR
r = pR = ρ, if agents were not to discount future
benefits and costs, safe type’s contract has strictly better terms. Both types would prefer safe type’s
contract. It creates the adverse selection problem in static environment, and gives incetive to the bank
to charge a global rate R. Eventually, since Rs < R < Rr, safe types are worse off and risky types are
better off. In what follows, in dynamic environment, we will demonstrate that, if βs ≥ βr, there exists
an incentive compatible contract scheme such that agents of each type prefer their own contracts (agents
are screened according to their types). We also show that such a scheme requires Rs1 > R
s
2. Intuitively,
we exploit the difference between discount factors. By sufficiently increasing the early installment of safe
type’s contract, it is possible to make it unattractive to risky type even though Rr > Rs, i.e. risky type’s
contract requires a higher undiscounted total payment. Later, we show the welfare gain of our individual
lending mechanism over the corresponding JL schemes.
3 Dynamic Contract with Observable Output
We now propose a dynamic contracting mechanism which addresses hidden types i.e. the adverse
selection issue. Initially, we will fix risky types repayment scheme {Rr1, Rr2} = {Rr2 , Rr2 }, i.e. a standard
repayment schedule in practice, and establish the existence of {Rs1, Rs2} that satisfies the requirements
provided in the following proposition.
Without loss of generality, we fix outside option to 0 for all types. Hence, individual rationality
constraints for safe and risky types are as follows:
IR(s) : EUs(R
s
1, R
s
2) ≥ 0 (1)
IR(r) : EUr(R
r
1, R
r
2) ≥ 0 (2)
Solving IR’s of both types we get the minimum level of output:
X ≥ R
s
1(1− βs) + βsRs
1− βs
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X ≥ Rr
2
We endogenously get Rr2 ≤ X which is the condition that period-wise payment for risky type cannot
be greater than period-wise payment. It is also received in aggregate terms for risky type. In addition,
since Rs < Rr, the result in aggregate terms is valid for safe type, too. We additionally assume X ≥ Rst
for t = 1, 2, since poor people are assumed to have no endownments. We also need incentive compatibility
constraints to induce each agent to prefer the credit contract suited for her own type:
IC(s) : EUs(R
s
1, R
s
2) ≥ EUs(Rr1, Rr2) (3)
IC(r) : EUr(R
r
1, R
r
2) ≥ EUr(Rs1, Rs2) (4)
where we fix Rrt =
Rr
2 in the contract as in most of real-world contracts. We only allow to choose the
reallocation of safe type’s payment scheme. By solving these IC’s,
ps
2pr
(1 + βs)− βs
1− βs Rs ≥ R
s
1 ≥
ps
2pr
(1 + βr)− βr
1− βr Rs (5)
As long as βs ≥ βr, there exists Rs1 which can implement the contract. The consequences are represented
in following proposition.
Proposition 1 For all βi, pi ∈ (0, 1), βs ≥ βr and ps > pr with sufficiently large output level X, there
exists a two-period repayment schedule {Rs1, Rs2, Rr1, Rr2} s.t.
1. {Rr1, Rr2} = {R
r
2 ,
Rr
2 }
2. Safe type agents prefer {Rs1, Rs2}
3. Risky type agents prefer {Rr1, Rr2}
4. Bank’s expected revenue from both type is the same
where Rs1 satisfies (5), and R
s
2 = Rs −Rs1 with ZPC.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 1 shows the existence of a contracting scheme that screens agents according to their types.
We note that MFI can implement this scheme with only chosing one variable Rs1. In the next section, we
investigate the welfare properties of this mechanism. We also note that the case βs = βr, the contract is
unique. We also note that there may be cases in which Rs1 > Rs. This means safe type may pay more than
total amount in the first period, then she receives some amount back at the final period. Our assumption
X > Rs1 makes this kind of situation possible. On the other hand, there is an upper bound for βr which
gives rise to that Rs1 ≤ Rs always holds2.
We now turn to welfare issues. In what follows, we first show that our becnhmark payment interval
maximizes the expected welfare of th society when we set Rs1 ot its lower bound. By doing so, we receive
the maximum welfare case of our becnhmark contract. We then compare the differentiated repayment
schemes we propose is superior to JL contracts in terms of both social and individual welfares.
2See Appendix.
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Claim: Rs∗1 =
ps
2pr
(1+βr)−βr
1−βr Rs must be the choice in the benchmark contract in order to get the
maximal level of safe type utility, and hence maximize the societal welfare.
Since societal welfare in this case is as follows,
EWsoc(R
s
1, R
s
2,
Rr
2
,
Rr
2
) = θpsβs((βs + 1)X − βsRs + (βs − 1)Rs1)
+(1− θ)prβr((βr + 1)X −Rr βr + 1
2
)
Since βs < 1, the minimal value of R
s
1 the one that maximizes the expected utility of the safe type.
Due to uniform scheme of risky type, it is also welfare maximizing choice for the society.
3.1 Individual vs. Joint Liability
Since our contract has the ability to differentiate types as in the case that types are common knowloedge,
it improves the wealth when compared with the uniform contract with (R1, R2) and where R1 + R2 = R.
An alternative mechanism could make use of JL within a dynamic contract.
In JL, positive assortive matching is one possibility. Ghatak (1999) and van Tassel (1999) argue that
it is more likely to occur in static environment. Moreover, the socially optimal matching may change in
dynamic environment. Thus, we are not sure which is the welfare superior. As a result we take both cases
of JL into account. In a 2-person group scheme, expected welfare of type i when she borrows with a group
of j type is given as follows:
EUJLi (R
1
i , R
2
i , j) = pipjβi(X −Ri1) + pi(1− pj)βi(X −Ri1 −Rj1) (6)
+ pipjβ
2
i (X −Ri1) + pi(1− pj)β2i (X −Ri2 −Rj2) (7)
where j is type of her peer in the group. Positive assortive matching means j = i, whereas, negative
asortive matching is that j and i are different types. As a result, social welfare in case of a general matching
of i and j types is defined as follows:
EW JLsoc (R
1
i , R
2
i , R
1
j , R
2
j , i, j) = θi(pipjβi(X −Ri1) + pi(1− pj)βi(X −Ri1 −Rj1) (8)
+ pipjβ
2
i (X −Ri1) + pi(1− pj)β2i (X −Ri2 −Rj2))+ (9)
(1− θi)(pjpiβj(X −Rj1) + pj(1− pi)βj(X −Rj1 −Ri1) (10)
+ pjpiβ
2
j (X −Rj1) + pj(1− pi)β2j (X −Rj2 −Ri2)) (11)
where θi is the fraction of i tyoe in the society. On the other hand, following proposition shows that
individual lending is welfare-superior to both cases of group lending.
Proposition 2 For a given periodic repayment dynamic contract with differing time preferences of bor-
rowers, individual liability credit scheme provided in Proposition 1 welfare dominates a JL scheme both
individually and socially.
Proof. See Appendix.
The proposition above implies that we need not concern ourselves with JL schemes once we implement
a dynamic repayment scheme with varying time preferences of agents. This result is quite intuitive3. In
3The result is valid for all types of JL, not necessarily for only full liability case.
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an environment where output is observable, JL mechanisms could be used to address adverse selection
issues. However, the difference in time preferences allow us to construct a pair of contracts such that each
agent self-selects herself to the contract suitable for her type. Implementing JL in this context brings no
improvement in selection while burdening each agent with a partner’s risks. Hence, individual liability
mechanisms are superior in welfare4. We also illustrate the result with an example of initial parameters.
Example 1: In this example we show that our benchmark contract with payment scheme (Rs∗1 , Rs∗2 ,
Rr
2 ,
Rr
2 )
improves welfare both individually and thus societally when compared with positive (i, i) and negative (i, j)
assortive matching cases of JL. Exogenous parameters are (θ, ps, pr, ρ, βr, βs, X),
Exogenous parameters
βs βr ρ pr ps X θ
0.9 0.7 1.05 0.7 0.8 1.2 0.6
Using psRs = prRr = pR = ρ, we calculate endogenous parameters,
Endogenous paramters
R Rs Rr p
1.3816 1.3125 1.5000 0.7600
Then selecting benchmark contract for safe types in case of individual liability to maximize societal
welfare, we calculate Rs∗1 = 1.1875, thus Rs∗2 = 0.1250. We also note that Rr1 = Rr2. With these in hand,
we calcaluate and compare welfares with the JL in case of both types of matchings.
Welfare Individual contract JL (i, i) matching JL (i, j) matching
Society 0.5735 0.3860 0.3386
Safe agent 0.7059 0.5184 0.3978
Risky agent 0.3749 0.1874 0.2499
As illustrated, individual contract scheme we proposed improves the welfare in significant levels. In our
scheme society has expected welfare as 0.5735, whereas the levels are 0.3860 and 0.3386 in positive and
negative assortive matching cases respectively of gruop lending with full liaibility. Additionally, individual
based utilities are ex antr increased for both types. Safe type agent receives 0.7059 in our scheme, whereas
she gets 0.5184 in maximal case of JL. The result is valid by comparing individual vs group lending with
numbers 0.3749 and 0.2499, respectively. The impact of individual improvements on the societal increase
depends on the composition of society i.e. θ. Moreover, the effect of the individual contract on each type
is related to their pi and βi values.
4 The Contract with Welfare Evaluations
So far we restricted ourselves the optimal choice of safe type’s contract {Rs1, Rs2} keeping {Rr1, Rr2} =
{Rr2 , R
r
2 }. We demonstrated the welfare gain associated with differentiating safe type’s contract. Now we
4Indeed, as argued in introduction, there are further transaction costs associated with JL mechanisms which we do not
account for in our welfare calculations. Thus, the welfare improvement we characterized is a lower bound at best
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let Rr1 6= Rr2, so the problem becomes choosing {Rr1, Rs1}. Since Ri2 = Ri − Ri1, we do not count them as
choice variables. Following proposition characterizes the new pair of efficient contracts and then get the
ones that are welfare maxizing. We again have same IC and IR constraints, but not with Rr2 but with
(Rr1, R
r
2). Solving those we get following restrictions:
X ≥ R
i
1(1− βi) + βiRi
1− βi ∀ i ∈ {s, r}
Rs
βr(
ps
pr
− 1)
1− βr ≤ R
s
1 −Rr1 ≤ Rs
βs(
ps
pr
− 1)
1− βs
As long as βs ≥ βr, the contract is pmlementable. Following proposition states that it can be different
from our benchmark contracting scheme.
Proposition 3 For all pi, βi ∈ (0, 1) and βs ≥ βr with ps > pr with sufficiently large output level X, there
exists a two-period repayment schedule {Rs1, Rs2, Rr1, Rr2} s.t. condition in Proposition 1 are satisfied and
{Rs1, Rs2} is not necessarily {Rr/2, Rr/2}
Proof. See Appendix.
We also note that the case βs = βr, the contract is unique. The merit of flexibility in both types’
contracts becomes apparent when we consider the welfare improvement. The societal welfare can be
rewritten as:
EWsoc(R
s
1, R
s
2, R
r
1, R
r
2) = K + θpsβs(βs − 1)Rs
(1 + βr)
ps
2pr
− βr
1− βr + (1− θ)prβr(βr − 1)
Rr
2
where K = θpsβs(1 + βs)X − θpsβ2sRs + (1− θ)prβr(1 + βr)X − (1− θ)prβ2rRr.
As can be seen, we have negative coefficients with Rs1 and R
r
1, and restriction containing difference of
the two. By taking Rr1 = 0, and also setting minimum R
s
1, we maximize the societal welfare, as well as
that of individuals. Following proposition represents the result.
Proposition 4 Fully differentiated contract pair with {Rs∗1 , Rs∗2 , Rr∗1 , Rr∗2 } yields the maximum welfare
both individually and socially, where Rr∗1 = 0 and Rs∗1 = Rs
βr(
ps
pr
−1)
1−βr . From ZPC, payments at t = 2 is
found by Ri2 = Ri −Ri1 for both types.
Proof. See Appendix.
Thus, allowing one type contract with payment only at t = 2, and reallocating the other compared
with benchmark contract, we identify the welfare maximizing one for both individuals and the society.
Proposition 4 implies that it is possible to improve welfare further if we allow risky type’s contract to have
varying period installments. In practice, it is common among microcredit institutions to demand uniform
installments. Our result, however, suggests otherwise in the presence of heterogeneous time preferences.
We illutrate welfare increase with an example of benchmark paramaters:
Example 2: We illustrate that our new contract (with Rr1 choice) further improve the welfare in both
individual and societal levels when compared with the benchmark contract we represented. We use same
parameter values as in Example 1.
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Welfare Contract with (Rs∗1 , Rr∗1 ) Benchmark contract
Society 0.6498 0.5735
Safe 0.7596 0.7059
Risky 0.4851 0.3749
We observe that for this set of parameters, ex ante societal welfare jumps from 0.5735 to 0.6498 with
this further choice in the contracting scheme. Moreover, both risky and safe types receive increases in their
utilities as 0.0537 and 0.1102, respectively. We note that relative levels of individual welfare improvements
depend on pi and βi values. In addition, θ determines the effect of individual enhancements on the overall
improvement of welfare.
5 History dependent probabilities
We now turn our attention into a scenario in which the outcome of the first period -being either success
or fail- has an affect on the probability of success in the second period. This is an attempt to introduce
a more realistic model. We define γ as the memory dependence of the projects of both types. At t = 2,
the probability of success and fail for each type is now conditional on the outcome at t = 1. We introduce
symmetric effect of past on t = 2 with γ. Now p1,i 6= p2,i there pt,i is the success probability of type i at
time t. If agent of type i succeeds at t = 1, p2,i = p1,i + γ, otherwise, it is p2,i = p1,i − γ. Thus the nature
of dependency is same for each type and bad or good news from period 1 affects in same amount.
The second periods probabilty of success is now kind of an expected probability of success for either
type, and it is equal to pi2 = 2p
i
1γ + p
i
1 − γ. We can also summarize these like below:
p2,i(Success at t = 2|Success at t = 1) = p1,i + γ
p2,i(Success at t = 2|Failure at t = 1) = p1,i − γ
Note that ps > pr implies ps,2 > pr,2. In this environment, expected utility of agent type i is the
following:
EUi = βipi(X −Rs1) + β2i (pi(pi + γ) + (1− pi)(pi − γ))(X −Ri2) (12)
This extension alters ZPC of bank, and IR’s as well as IC constraints of the individuals. Here is ZPC
of the bank with this manipulation:
piR
i
1 + (pi(pi + γ) + (1− pi)(pi − γ))Rs2 = ρ ∀ i ∈ {s, r} (13)
Solving ZPC above for both types gives the second periods’ repayment i.e.
Ri2 =
(Ri −Ri1)pi
2γpi + pi − γ
IR(s):
psβs(X −Rs1) + β2s (2psγ + ps − γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ps,2
(X −Rs2) ≥ 0
IR(r):
prβr(X −Rr1) + β2r (2prγ + pr − γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
pr,2
(X −Rr2) ≥ 0
11
Solving the individual rationality constraints above gives a lower bound for the level of output X :
X ≥ piR
i
1 +R
i
2(2piγβi + piβi − γ)
pi + piβi + 2piγβi − γ (14)
where Ri2 =
(Ri−Ri1)pi
2γpi+pi−γ .
The new incentive compatibility constraints are now;
IC(s):
psβs(X −Rs1) + β2s (2psγ + ps − γ)Rs2 ≥ psβs(X −Rr1) + β2s (2psγ + ps − γ)(X −Rr2)
IC(r):
prβr(X −Rr1) + β2r (2prγ + pr − γ)Rr2 ≥ prβr(X −Rs1) + β2r (2prγ + pr − γ)(X −Rs2)
Note that the only difference from the previous incentive compatibility constraints is in the second
periods’ probability of success. Following proposition states the existence of the efficient individual lending
contracting schemes in this environment.
Proposition 5 For all pi, βi ∈ (0, 1), ps > pr, and sufficiently large output level X, if history effect is
appropriate5, there exists a fully differentiated contract pair for both types; who has history dependent
probabilities of success (ps,2, pr,2), which gives the maximum welfare both individually and societally.
Proof. Solving IC(s), and IC(r), above; gives
Rs1(1− βs)−Rr1(1 +
βsps,2pr
pr,2ps
) ≤ βsρ(ps,2 − pr,2)
pspr,2
Rs1(1 +
βrpr,2ps
ps,2pr
)−Rr1(1− βr) ≥
βrρ(ps,2 − pr,2)
prps,2
Note that, to be able to maximize social welfare which is
EW
′(Rs1,R
s
2,R
r
1,R
r
2)=θ(psβs(X−Rs1)+β2s (2psγ+ps−γ)Rs2)+
soc
(1− θ) (prβr(X −Rr1) + β2r (2prγ + pr − γ)Rr2)
we need to take Rs1 and R
r
1 as small as possible
6. For IC(r) to be satisfied, Rs1 should be nonzero, however,
Rr1 = 0 poses no threat for the IC constraints. Now that we are sure, we can set R
r
1 = 0 this gives new
boundaries for Rs1; which is;
βrρ(ps,2−pr,2)
prps,2
(1 +
βrpr,2ps
ps,2pr
)
≤ Rs1 ≤
βsρ(ps,2−pr,2)
pspr,2
(1− βs)
As long as the upper bound is greater than the lower bound for Rs1, we can ensure that there exists
a repayment schedule which deals with the adverse selection problem as well as maximizes social and
5We have some limitations on γ: 0 ≤ γ, pi + γ ≤ 1, pi − γ ≥ 0 and 0 < pi2 < 1 for all types.
6As in the previous propositions, more specifically as in Proposition 2 and 4
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individual welfare. Need to show that
βrρ(ps,2−pr,2)
prps,2
(1 +
βrpr,2ps
ps,2pr
)
≤
βsρ(ps,2−pr,2)
pspr,2
(1− βs)
By some algebra, we get
2βsβrpspr,2 + βsps,2pr − βrpr,2ps ≥ 0
Note that, prps,2 ≥ pspr,2 implies the inequality above 7. This ensures that the upper bound of Rs1 is
strictly greater than the lower bound. Hence, we can choose Rs1 as the lower bound which satisfies the
IC by construction and maximizes both social and individual welfare 8. Summing up all, the repayment
schedule {Rs∗1 , Rs∗2 , Rr∗1 , Rr∗2 } where
Rs∗1 =
βrρ(ps,2 − pr,2)
ps,2pr + βrpr,2ps
Rs∗2 =
(Rs −Rs1)ps
2γps + ps − γ
Rr∗1 = 0
Rr∗2 =
Rrpr
2γpr + pr − γ
identify the optimal contract that solves adverse selection problem and maximizes the social welfare as
well as that of individuals.
We note that, since period-wise success probabilities are not uniform in this environment. Rit also
depends upon (pi1, p
i
2), since the outcome of first period affects the second.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced a dynamic credit contract with individual lending to tackle adverse selection
issues in micro-credits. We first assumed that output is fully observable to the lender and showed that
in a dynamic setting, it is possible to formulate an individual lending scheme that screens safe and risky
borrowers, generates the same expected revenue for the lender and improves welfare of the society. This has
profound implications for the evolution of microcredit programs. There has been a shift from group lending
to individual lending in many leading microcredit institutions (Armendariz de Aghion and Morduch 2005,
119-120). Given that forming and maintaining a peer group has transaction costs and the empirical evidence
about its effectiveness is mixed, a switch to robust individual lending mechanisms should be desirable. We
offer one such mechanism, based on the premise that borrowers have different time preferences.
Our mechanism perfectly screens borrowers with differentiated contracts. Bank is still equally likely to
extend contracts to all sorts of borrowers, so the reach of credit is not harmed. Indeed, by saving from the
costs associated to JL mechanisms, our mechanism is likely to extend the reach of credit opportunities.
This is a very desirable result and in accordance with objectives of micro-credit programs.
7Easily it can be seen by plugging pi,2 into prps,2 > pspr,2 where pi,2 = (2piγ + pi − γ) for all i ∈ {s, r}
8Note that, γ = 0 is the benchmark case which is consistent with the result here as long as safe type discounts less than
the risky type does.
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In our mechanism, possibility of renegotiation in the interim is irrelevant due to ZPC of MFI. On the
other hand, future research could generalize our mechanism to T periods, or even to infinite horizon. A
natural extension could be renewal of credits. Borrowers might repeat the game in our mechanism more
than once and reputation concerns might play a significant part. Throughout our analysis, we also kept the
population of borrowers constant. The impact of our mechanism on the safe-risky composition of society
over time could be another line of research.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Note that the expected utility of an agent is the following:
EUi(H1, H2) = piβi(X −H1) + piβ2i (X −H2) ∀i ∈ {s, r}
where Ht is the payment scheme ∀ t ∈ {1, 2}. Recall that the bank sets it. For such a contract to exist,
need to see that there is an interval for Rs1 to be chosen, so that we can choose it and satisfy the conditions
(with sufficiently large X of course, to be able to satisfy agents to participate.) Remember, the boundaries
coming from individual compatibility constraints are9:
ps
2pr
(1 + βr)− βr
1− βr Rs ≤ R
s
1 ≤
ps
2pr
(1 + βs)− βs
1− βs Rs
and the lower boundary of the output level X is either10
Rs1(1− βs) + βsRs
1 + βs
≤ X or Rr
2
≤ X
With the assumption of the output level X being sufficiently large, each agent’s contract yields nonnegative
benefits in expected terms and which ensures participation. Therefore, Individual rationality constraints
are not an issue here. As long as we can show that the upper bound is greater than the lower bound of
Rs1, we are done. But, with βs ≥ βr and ps ≥ pr, one can easily see that;
ps
2pr
(1 + βr)− βr
1− βr Rs ≤
ps
2pr
(1 + βs)− βs
1− βs Rs
Hence, there exists Rs1 that satisfy individual compatibility constraints. This basically completes the proof.
Now that, we claim
ps
2pr
(1+βr)−βr
1−βr ≥ 12 .
ps
pr
(1 + βr)− 2βr ≥ 1− βr
ps
pr
(1 + βr) ≥ 1 + βr ⇒ Rs1 >
Rs
2
(15)
Also note that from ICr (4), if we assume the first instalment R
s
1 cannot be greater than the total repayment
Rs, then we will have an upper bound for risky types discounting which is βr ≤ 2prps − 1. However, it is not
that strict. We can also assume that the safe type borrower can pay more than the repayment at the first
stage and get some back at the second stage.
9where IC(s) : EUs(R
s
1, R
s
2) ≥ EUs(Rr1, Rr2) and IC(r) : EUr(Rr1, Rr2) ≥ EUr(Rs1, Rs2)
10where IR(s) : EUs(R
s
1, R
s
2) ≥ 0 and IR(r) : EUr(Rr1, Rr2) ≥ 0
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8.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Under individual liability, we have
EUi(R
i
1, R
i
2) = piβi(X −Ri1) + piβ2i (X −Ri2) (16)
The joint liability contract yields the following utility for type i who has the peer j,
EUJLi (R
i
1, R
i
2, R
j
1, R
j
2, j) = pipjβi(X −Ri1) + pi(1− pj)βi(X −Ri1 −Rj1)
+ pipjβ
2
i (X −Ri1) + pi(1− pj)β2i (X −Ri2 −Rj2)
Under joint liability, each borrower i has to cover for her associate’s payment Rj in case of failure 11.
We need to show EUi() > EU
JL
i () ∀Ri, Rj ∈ R++. The expression becomes:
pi(X −Ri1) + piβi(X −Ri2) > [pipj + pi(1− pj)](X −Ri1) + βi[pipj + pi(1− pj)](X −Ri2)
− pi(1− pj)Rj1 − βipi(1− pj)Rj2
Since pipj + pi(1− pj) = pi, this reduces to
pi(1− pj)Rj1 + βipi(1− pj)Rj2 > 0
which is satisfied for sure.
8.3 Proof of Proposition 3
Here, rather than fixing Rr1 to
Rr
2 , we choose both R
s
1and R
r
1 where they are the repayment in the
first period for the safe type and repayment in the first period for the risky type, respectively. From the
ZPC, the secnd period’s repayment levels are determined. Under the light of this new set-up, individual
rationality and incentive compatibility constraints, in the same order presented in Proposition 1, are the
followings:
IR(s) : βsps(X −Rs1) + β2sps(X − rs2) ≥ 0
IR(r) : βrpr(X −Rr1) + β2rpr(X −Rr2) ≥ 0
IC(s) : βsps(X −Rs1) + β2sps(X −Rs2) ≥ βsps(X −Rr1) + β2sps(X −Rr2)
IC(r) : βrpr(X −Rr1) + β2rpr(X −Rr2) ≥ βrpr(X −Rs1) + β2rpr(X −Rs2)
We still have psRs = prRr = pR = ρ as the moneylender’s behaviour. Solving the participation
conditions i.e. IRs gives a new lower boundary for the output level X; which is
max
{
Rs1(1− βs) + βsRs
(1 + βs)
,
Rr1(1− βr) + βrRr
(1 + βr)
}
11which occurs with probability pi(1− pj)
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After achieving the level of Output to satisfy the players participate in the mechanism, we need to lead
either type to behave as themselves. Incentive Compatibility constraints capture this requirement. Hence,
solving the last two inequality above yields;
Rs
βr(
ps
pr
− 1)
1− βr ≤ R
s
1 −Rr1 ≤ Rs
βs(
ps
pr
− 1)
1− βs
Here again, since the both boundaries are positive, as long as the upper bound is greater than the lower
bound, we can find a pair {Rs1, Rr1}, that satisfies the IC constraints and solves the adverse selection
problem. But, as an assumption we have βs ≥ βr, and this ensures that there is a positive interval for
Rs1 −Rr1. This concludes the proof so far.
8.4 Proof of Proposition 4
Recall from proposition 1 and 2 we could have solved the adverse selection problem and increased the
social welfare compared to group lending with full liabilty by an individual based contract.12. Now we
search further for a better contract by manipulating the first period payment of the risky type just as we
did for the safe type instead of fixing it. As long as we have sufficiently large enough output level X; which
is specified in proposition 3, remember from the same proposition, we had a positive interval for Rs1−Rr1 13.
We now try to maximize agents’ payoffs by not violating the constraints. As in the previous propositions,
the lower Ri1 where i ∈ {s, r}, the higher expected social payoff. Hence, Rr1 = 0 14 will maximize the risky
types’ payoff and together with the inequality above (Rs1−Rr1) brings up a new condition for Rs1; which is:
Rs1 ≥ Rs
βr(
ps
pr
− 1)
1− βr .
To maximize EW ; Rs1 needs to bind as well. Hence the contract (H
s(Rs1, R
s
2), H
r(Rr1, R
r
2)) maximizes social
as well as individual wealth where
Rs∗1 = Rs
βr(
ps
pr
− 1)
1− βr
Rs∗2 = Rs(1−
βs(
ps
pr
− 1)
1− βs )
Rr∗1 = 0, R
r∗
2 = Rr
This completes the proof.
12Rr1 =
Rr
2
and Rs1 =
ps
2pr
(1+βr)−βr
1−βr Rs
13that also ensures the existence of such contract
14note that, we are not allowed to choose Rs1 = 0 because of the existence of such a contract.
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